ABSTRACT. Three values for non-transferable utility games -the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value -are compared in a simple example.
the payoffs of a player by a factor a > 0 multiplies his value payoffs by the same factor a).
The above three requirements do not however determine the NTU-value uniquely. Indeed, different NTU-values have been proposed in the literature; the most notable are due to Harsanyi (1963) , Shapley (1969) , and Maschler and Owen (1992) . 1 In this short note we analyze in detail a simple example of an NTU-game where the three values yield different outcomes. It is essentially the simplest possible example: there are just three players (a two-player game is a pure bargaining problem), and the coalitional function corresponds to a TU-game except for one coalition, for which the transfers of utility are possible albeit at a rate different from 1. The difference between the values will be seen to be due to the way that subcoalitions are handled. 2 It is to be hoped that the analysis here will shed further light on the NTU-values, their meanings and interpretations.
The reader is referred to the chapters on value in the Handbook of Game Theory, in particular McLean (2002) , for further material and references.
The game is defined in Section 2; the values are computed in Sections 3-5, and compared in Section 6. Sections 7 and 8 present an exchange economy (a ''market'') and a ''prize game'' (see Hart (1994) ) that generate our example.
Some notations: R is the real line; for a finite set S, the number of elements of S is denoted jSj; the jSj-dimensional Euclidean space with coordinates indexed by S (or, equivalently, the set of real functions on S) is R S ; the nonnegative orthant of R S is R S þ ; and A & B denotes weak inclusion (i.e., possibly A ¼ B).
THE EXAMPLE
A non-transferable utility game in coalitional form is a pair ðN; VÞ, where N -the set of players -is a finite set, and V -the coalitional function -is a mapping that associates to each coalition S & N the set VðSÞ & R S of feasible payoff vectors for S. An element x ¼ ðx i Þ i2S of VðSÞ is interpreted as follows: there exists an outcome that is feasible for the coalition S whose utility to player i is x i (for each i in S). Thus VðSÞ is the set of utility combinations that are feasible for the coalition S. The standard assumptions are that for each nonempty coalition S, the set VðSÞ is a nonempty strict subset of R S that is closed, convex, and comprehensive (y x 2 VðSÞ implies y 2 VðSÞ 
Except for coalition f1; 2g -whose feasible set V(12) is depicted in Figure 1 -our game ðN; VÞ coincides with a TU-game, which we denote by ðN; wÞ or ðN; WÞ. Thus w is the worth function wðSÞ ¼ 36; for S ¼ f1; 2g; f1; 2; 3g, 0; otherwise,
and WðSÞ ¼ fx 2 R S :
wðSÞg for all S.
The game ðN; VÞ is 0-normalized (single players get 0) and monotonic (if S & T and x 2 VðSÞ then 4 (x; 0 T nS Þ 2 VðTÞ). The (Pareto efficient) boundary of VðNÞ, which is denoted oVðNÞ, is a hyperplane with slope k ¼ ð1; 1; 1Þ.
This example is not new; a similar one appears in Owen (1972) (see also Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, p. 369) ).
THE SHAPLEY NTU-VALUE
The Shapley NTU-value for a general NTU-game ðN; VÞ is obtained by the following procedure:
where the TU-game ðN; v k Þ is obtained from ðN; VÞ by allowing transfers of utilities at the rates k, i.e., v k ðSÞ ¼ supf
VðSÞg for all 5 S & N, and u TU is the Shapley TU-value. 2. If z is feasible for the grand coalition, i.e., if z 2 VðNÞ, then z is a Shapley NTU-value of ðN; VÞ.
For our game ðN; VÞ only k ¼ ð1; 1; 1Þ needs to be considered (any k that is not a multiple of ð1; 1; 1Þ yields v k ðNÞ ¼ 1), in which case v k w (see (1)). The Shapley TU-value r S of each subgame 6 ðS; wÞ is easily computed: r fig ¼ 0 for singletons, and r f1;2g ¼ ð18; 18Þ, r f1;3g ¼ ð0; 0Þ, and r f2;3g ¼ ð0; 0Þ for the twoplayer subgames. It will be convenient to write r S as a threedimensional vector with ''-'' for the players outside S: r f1;2g ¼ ð18; 18; ÀÞ; r f1;3g ¼ ð0; À; 0Þ; r f2;3g ¼ ðÀ; 0; 0Þ:
Next, for each two-player coalition S we adjoin to r S a payoff for the missing player (in boldface below) so that the resulting payoff vectorr S is efficient for N (i.e., the coordinates add up to 36): r f1;2g ¼ ð18; 18; 0Þ; r f1;3g ¼ ð0; 36; 0Þ; r f2;3g ¼ ð36; 0; 0Þ:
We then average these three vectors to obtain the value for N: r N ¼ ð18; 18; 0Þ:
Indeed, the Shapley TU-value of a player i in a TU-game ðN; vÞ is the average of his marginal contribution to the grand coalition vðNÞ À vðNniÞ, and his values in the subgames with jNj À 1 players:
see Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, p. 369) . The above payoff vector r N is thus the unique Shapley NTUvalue of our game ðN; VÞ.
THE HARSANYI NTU-VALUE
The Harsanyi NTU-value for a general NTU-game ðN; VÞ is obtained by the following procedure:
• For each weight vector k 2 R N þ ; k 6 ¼ 0: 1. Let the payoff vector z 2 oVðNÞ be the k-egalitarian solution of the game ðN; VÞ. 2. If k is a supporting normal to the boundary of VðNÞ at z (i.e., if z is also k-utilitarian) then z is a Harsanyi NTUvalue of ðN; VÞ. The k-egalitarian solution is constructed recursively: for each S, given the payoff vectors g T 2 VðTÞ for all strict subsets T of S, the payoff vector g S is determined by g S 2 oVðSÞ and
The k-egalitarian solution z is the resulting payoff vector g N for the grand coalition. For our game ðN; VÞ we need to consider only k ¼ ð1; 1; 1Þ. This yields g fig ¼ 0 Hart (1985, (4.6) ). Thus g N is the egalitarian solution for N, and therefore the unique Harsanyi NTU-value of ðN; VÞ; in terms of Hart (1985) , the collection (g S Þ S&N we have obtained is the Harsanyi payoff configuration.
THE MASCHLER-OWEN CONSISTENT NTU-VALUE
The Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value for a general NTUgame ðN; VÞ is obtained recursively by the following procedure:
Let S be a coalition, and assume that a payoff vector c T 2 VðTÞ is given for all strict subcoalitions T of S. For each weight vector k 2 R 
If z is feasible for the coalition S, i.e., if z 2 VðSÞ, then define c S ¼ z.
The resulting payoff vector c N for the grand coalition is then a Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value of ðN; VÞ.
Formula (4) -which is a generalization of (2) in the TU-case -is equivalent to
see Proposition 4 and Formula (3) in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) , and Formula (5.1) in Maschler and Owen (1989 
The computations leading to these values clearly exhibit that the difference between them derives from the way the intermediate payoff vector x f1;2g for the coalition f1; 2g -the only coalition whose feasible set is not of the TU-type -is determined. Indeed, the payoff vectors x S for all other strict subsets of N are identical for the three values, and, once all the x S are given, the value for the grand coalition x N is uniquely determined (by the ''extension'' construction with respect to k ¼ ð1; 1; 1Þ, the unique supporting normal to oVðNÞ).
The payoff vectors x f1;2g for the coalition f1; 2g are, respectively, x Sh f1;2g ¼ ð18; 18Þ; x Ha f1;2g ¼ ð12; 12Þ; x MO f1;2g ¼ ð18; 9Þ; (see Figure 2) . The Shapley NTU-value and the Harsanyi NTU-value both take x f1;2g to be an egalitarian outcome (i.e., an ''equal-split'' payoff vector -since the rates of interpersonal utility comparison k dictated by the grand coalition satisfy
The difference is that the Harsanyi approach uses Vð12Þ, the feasible set for f1; 2g, to determine x f1;2g ; whereas the Shapley approach allows transfers of utility at the rates k of the grand coalition and so V(12) is replaced by W(12) (which corresponds to v k (12)). Thus x Ha f1;2g ¼ ð12; 12Þ 2 oVð12Þ and x Sh f1;2g ¼ ð18; 18Þ 2 oWð12Þ. As for the Maschler-Owen NTUvalue, it considers coalition f1; 2g independently of the grand SERGIU HART coalition: x f1;2g is determined by the f1; 2g-subgame only. Moreover, x f1;2g is determined for f1; 2g in exactly the same way that x N is determined for N; this property -that x S is the consistent NTU-value of the S-subgame for each S -is called ''subcoalition perfectness'' in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, p. 366) . Thus x MO f1;2g ¼ ð18; 9Þ, the Nash bargaining solution of the two-person game.
Which approach is ''correct''? There cannot be a definite answer. 8 For instance, it may depend on the way the interactions between the players are conducted. 9 If transfers are allowed (or ''implied'' by the grand coalition 10 ) as in the Shapley NTU-value, then player 3 becomes a null (''dummy'') player, and his value of 0 is justified. Otherwise player 3 is not a null player, and his value is positive. The Harsanyi NTU-value is egalitarian-based; therefore players 1 and 2 get equal payoffs. In contrast, the Maschler-Owen NTU-value takes into account the asymmetry between the two players in the subcoalition f1; 2g -and is the only one to do so. Thus it appears that the Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value reflects the structure of this game better than the other NTU-values. Our example is essentially a market game. 12 For instance, take E to be the following exchange economy (''market''): there are three players (''traders'') i ¼ 1; 2; 3, and three commodities; the utility functions are
(a j denotes the quantity of good j), and the initial commodity bundles (''endowments'') are Our example is also essentially a hyperplane game, and it can thus be represented as a prize game; see Hart (1994) . Indeed, let the prize of the grand coalition be worth 36 to each player, and let the prize of coalition f1; 2g be worth 36 to player 1 and 18 to player 2 (there are no other prizes). The resulting game (N; V Ã ) is again identical to our example ðN; VÞ in the individually rational region, and its NTU-values are given by (5) .
